The Sleeping Sickness Commission of the -ping sickness which broke out in central Royal Society arrived in Uganda in 1902 and Pica at the end of the nineteenth century were joined a year later by Colonel David urred in the early stages of European occu-Bruce. Castellani had by then identified a ion of the continent. International boundaries trypanosome from the cerebrospinal fluid of one re largely indefinite, and the Belgian occupa-of the patients, and this finding, with Bruce's n of an area along the Nile north of the Great experience of trypanosomiasis in animals led to kes complicated the occupation of the Sudan the completion of the life history of the parasite Great Britain and Egypt in 1898. This area, and the finding of the vector, Glossina palpalis. )wn as the Lado Enclave (see Fig. 1 
), by
This knowledge enabled the Commission to ty remained under Belgian authority for the establish the main principles for the control of time of King Leopold I, who died in 1910.
the disease. These were, firstly, the need to sleeping sickness had been recognized on the break the man-fly contact either by mass movest Coast for over a hundred years, but it was ment of the people or by clearing vegetation so Known in central Africa until the late ninethat the natural habitat of the fly was destroyed. nth century when, between 1896 and 1906, Secondly, the extensive clinical research of the r half a million people were said to have died Commission proved the value of gland puncture m the disease in the Congo, and in Uganda for early diagnosis of the disease, and the need ween 1898 and 1908 two-thirds of the popu-for mass examination of the population so that on along the north west shores of Lake early cases could be detected. toria died.
Trypanosomes were first found in animals in 4tU-C!_A_ five years there were but rarely more than two or three members of the commission in the area at any one time.
Between 1906 and 1909 several thousand people were examined but no cases found. The distribution of the two species of fly, G. palpalis and G. morsitans, was mapped out, and the seasonal variations and possible food sources of the fly were studied. This work was published in remarkable detail in the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, the Bulletin of the Sleeping Sickness Bureau and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Reports of the Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories.
The Sudan Commission established that the disease could occur along the southern border of the Bahr el Ghazal province, and that the northern limit of G. palpalis did not extend far north of the border. Although no cases were found in the Sudan, they were recorded in the Belgian forts close to the border, to which, as medical men, they had access for the treatment of the Belgian officers and troop's. In his report on the-work of the Sudan Sleeping Sickness Commission for 1907-8 Ensor states "we may be, and probably shall be, unable to prevent sleeping sickness from crossing the frontier into the Sudan, but with care we ought to be able to limit its spread". The general precautions he advised were the clearing of watering places and road river crossings, the strict control of porters and carriers, the segregation of cases if, and when, found, and the setting up of examination and inspection posts at strategic places.
The first human cases in-the Sudan were found at the examination post of Raga on the French-Sudan frontier in immigrants and traders' carriers. Between 1909 and 1927, 73 cases, all infected outside the Sudan, were detected at Raga, but the comparative absence of G. palpalis in this area prevented the disease becoming established.
In 1908 it was known that cases were occurring inside the Lado Enclave. On June 16, 1910, this territory was taken over by the Sudan and the disease was soon diagnosed in and around Yei. In the first year Major C. Mackenzie, Colonel R. J. C. Thompson, and Yuzbashi Yusef eff Darwish (one of the most able of the Syrian doctors who did so much for the Sudan in its early days) mapped out the fly distribution, examined over 14,000 people in and around Yei, and found 218 cases of which 191 were in the first stage of the disease, 19 in the second and 8 in the third.
Within a year an area of 120,000 square yards had been cleared near Yei as a segregation camp for cases: a census of the people had been started, and porters from the Congo or Uganda were banned. The traders' route from Rejaf on the Nile, through Loka and Yei, to'the Congo was closed, and watering places and road river crossings cleared. In the first three years 547 cases were found, all within a 35-mile radius of Yei; thereafter the number of cases never rose above 32 per year.
In 1914 a further outbreak was discovered at Kajo Kaji close to the Nile, and extending to the east bank of the Nile at Opari. While the Yei outbreak was undoubtedly due to infection from the Congo, the Kajo Kaji and Opari outbreaks were due to infection from Uganda. These latter outbreaks were controlled by the usual precautions of clearing, making a census of the people, routine inspections, and restriction of traffic through the area. The wider area of spread of the disease and the difficulty of controlling traffic along the river made control of the Kajo Kaji outbreak more difficult, but by 1929 the old Lado Enclave and Mongaila Province were free of cases (Fig. 2) .
In the south-west corner of the Sudan a far more serious outbreak occurred in 1918. From Tembura to Meridi the people are the Azande, one of the largest tribes in Central Africa. Evans Pritchard has estimated their numbers to exceed over two million, of whom 200,000 are in the Sudan, the remainder being in the Congo and French Equatoria. They are a purely agricultural people growing a large variety of crops, and with a great knowledge of the natural food sources of the forests in which they live. Their agriculture is primitive in that it is "shifting," but they normally produce enough for their needs. Witchcraft and magic dominate almost all the major and minor crises of their lives. Partly because of their agricultural needs in the way of land, and partly because of superstition, they live in homesteads usually some distance from each other and they were, therefore, difficult to contact and far from co-operative.
In 1916 the authorities in French Equatoria sought the aid of troops from the Sudan to quell a rising in their area. Some 800 levies from Tembura, accompanied by a R.A.M.C. officer, went to the aid of the French, and on their return there were undoubted cases of sleeping sickness among them. In 1917 thousands of French Azande crossed the frontier to take up residence in the Sudan. One party reached Raga where 31 cases of the disease were discovered and another 8 were diagnosed in a party which reached Wau, but the majority settled just over the border around the Government post at Tembura. No cases were found in Tembura in 1917, but when Yuzbashi Nesib eff Baz, another Syrian medical officer, arrived at Tembura' in March 1918, he found 60 cases within the first week, and 255 in his first six months without ever leaving his station. All but 12 were recent immigrants from French territory. In August 1918 he was joined by Captain B. H. B. Spence of the R.A.M.C. In the station at this time were these two medical officers, a District Commissioner who supervised both Tembura and Yambio, and a military officer. There were two main roads from Tembura, one to Wau, 200 miles north, and the other to Yambio, 150 miles to the east, both of which were overgrown for most of the year.
In 1919 these two doctors toured the district and found the epidemic was limited to the Tembura area along 50 miles of the border and 621 cases were found. They made a census of the people, cut new roads, built bridges, and with wheel and compass compiled maps of some 5,000 square miles of the country. They built a segregation camp at Tembura for the patients, housed and fed them, and cleared watering places and road river crossings.
At the end of 1919 Spence went on leave and Baz was left alone. In January 1920, Captain Watson, D.S.O., M.C., arrived, but within' three days died as a result of an injury sustained on the journey. Spence and Baz had conceived the idea of a self-supporting settlement for the cases away from the administrative centre and close to the French border. Approval was obtained and on February 20, 1920, Baz with his staff and 669 patients set off on the 23 miles trek to the Sources Yubu Settlement. When they arrived they found the initial working party had prepared a site on the wrong side of the frontier.
Therefore grass had to be cut, roads made, huts built, watering places and streams had to be cleared and 150,000 lb of grain was brought by carriers from Yambio, 150 miles to the east. Baz's achievement can be measured by the fact that as long as there was food no cases deserted. In October inspections were started again. In many areas bicycles could now be used so that the task of inspections was eased, but the increased work meant that one medical officer had always to be in the settlement. By the end of September 1921, 1,517 cases had been admitted.
The success of the settlement led the authorities to hope that the organization of the people into villages would not only be possible but would facilitate sleeping sickness control. The Zande chiefs met this proposal with passive resistance and the simple cunning of never under-9 423
Proceedings of the Roj standing precisely what was wanted, or where, or when. The scheme therefore had to be abandoned and inspections in 1922 showed a further spread of the disease to the north and east. By February 1923, when Spence returned, the administrative staff had been increased with a second District Commissioner and it was decided to collect the people, not in villages, but on roads sited as far as possible along the'watersheds. Each subchief was to bring his own people to the road, to make and maintain their own length of the road with the clearing of river cross-ings and other watering places. A census roll was made and each adult tax-payer was issued with a numbered disc. All sleeping sickness regulations were, as far as possible, to be carried out through the authority of the chiefs. The ruling chiefs of the Zande belong to a special clan, almost a royal lineage, respected, feared and obeyed by the common rank and file. It was their support, as much as the full co-operation between the doctors and District Commissioners, that made the scheme the success it was. To -permit settlement on the roads more roads had to be made. Inspections were the easier, more people were seen, and the census of the population increased by 15,000. It is therefore not surprising that, in 1923, 839 new cases were detected, the highest ever in the Sudan. The move to the roads proved popular for it opened up the district, eased administration, and regular threemonthly inspections of the people enabled cases to be detected early. By 1929 the annual number of new cases had dropped to 18.
The largest number under treatment in the settlement at any one time was 1,837 (in 1925). Between 1920 and 1929, 3,630 cases had been admitted,'of whom 1,661 died (45 6%). Maurice (1930) points out that the multitude and variety of other tasks prevented clinical research. His closing words were true, but optimistic... "In the course of the campaign against sleeping sickness the habits of the natives were transformed.... The task of extirpating a disease had profoundly affected'the life of a people." The success of bringing the people to the' roads led to similar administrative action in the adjoining Yambio district, and westwards as far as Meridi. By 1930 it must have appeared that the disease had been conquered for the only new cases were the few from the Tembura area. In the following years the incidence in the Tembura area started to increase, a few sporadic cases were found in Yambio and the Mongalla areas again showed one or two cases a year, but there was no great epidemic. The next stage, therefore, appeared to be an attempt to eradicate the infection.
Up to this time, control of the disease had al Society of Medicine 10 depended on removing man from the fly. It had succeeded in controlling epidemic conditions but it was no more than a retreat from an insect. Mr. C. B. Symes visited the sleeping sickness areas in 1937 and discussed the practicability of his "Block" method of G. palpalis control. Unlike G. morsitans, G. palpalis always stays very close'to water and will not travel far from shade. The adult fly lives for six to nine months, and the female is larviparous, laying six to nine larvae during that time. It is one of the wonders of the insect world that the species has survived. Apart from the havoc of human disease and death that the tsetse has brought, it has been, and still is, a dominating influence on the habits and customs of the people over one-third of the African Continent. The principle of the "Block" method of control is simple. The river is divided into sections, or Blocks, between each of which is a large clearing 800 yards long, and 200 yards Wide on each side of the river. All trees and vegetation are cleared from this area, which then acts as a barrier so that fly from one section of the river will not move out of that section. Paths are cut along each side of the main river and of all the tributaries in that section and the hand catching of flies is started. When the density of fly in the first section is low a maintenance squad of fly catchers is left in that section and a mass fly-catching assault is made on the next section. By this means the fly population along the river is reduced, in stages, to a negligible level. In the Sudan we found that it was impossible to eradicate fly altogether, -but with maintenance fly catchers it was possible to keep the fly incidence at an extremely low level. Provided control over the number of cases was also maintained, the area was then virtually safe.
Fly control schemes, based on this method of control, were started in the Yei and Tembura areas. For some time it had been noted that two-thirds of the cases in the Tembura District came from the Yubu river and the immediate vicinity of Tembura. This area was reasonably compact, and the river itself was considered ideal for an experiment in fly control.
There is inevitably a lag period before-any results are seen in this type of control. The delaying factors are, first, the time needed to make the clearings and the fly-catching paths; secondly, the time taken to reduce fly numbers; and thirdly, the long incubation period of the disease, for cases are not easily detected much under a year after infection.
The "Block" scheme started along the Yubu river in 1938, and was completed by the beginning of 1941. By 1943 the fly catches were so Yi low that the barrier clearing of Block IV, beyond which there was no fly catching, was the only one we felt it was necessary to maintain thoroughly cleared. At the height of the scheme 220 fly boys were employed with three Sudanese public health officers in charge of the groups into which the boys were divided. They lived in special camps built in the sections and each month they came into the Yubu settlement for their pay, food, and the prizes awarded to those who caught the most flies. The proportion of cases in the Tembura district, attributed to the River Yubu, decreased to under 50 per cent in 1940, and by 1942 there were only 3 cases from the fly control area out of a total of 44 in the whole of the Tembura district.
Because of the war it had become increasingly important to remove any unnecessary restrictions and, if possible, to permit the people to cultivate as and where they wished. In 1940 all restrictions were removed and the chiefs agreed to undertake the necessary maintenance work in the fly control area. The Azande had gained their freedom of residence and we felt that we had evolved a method of control of the disease.
In 1943 Dr. J. D. Tothill, Director of Agriculture, visited Zande District and put forward a scheme for the development of the area. This was based on the growing of an economic crop (cotton), and the resettlement of the people in permanent family and group farms, so that not only an economic crop, but increased crops of other foods could be grown. A ginning, spinning and weaving factory was built, and a trading board under government sponsorship was established to provide cheap but attractive goods of all kinds. With the scheme went new schools, and an agricultural training college with facilities for research. Before it was completed the whole scheme cost over a million pounds. The task of moving the people began in 1946. Each family was given a plot of 30 acres, spaced along lines supervised by their headman. By 1951, 48,000 families had been resettled, new homes built, crops sown, and in some cases two or three rich harvests reaped, all of which was accomplished in an area of some 25,000 square miles by gentle persuasion and, what is more important, quickly, cheerfully and freely by the Zande themselves. A new town, Nzara, with the factory, had also been built close to Yambio.
Wartime restrictions had reduced the number of doctors in the area, and the work of the development plan gave all medical staff increased commitments. Sleeping sickness was fortunately at a very low level, but inspections continued to be carried out annually. The resettlement of the people in many ways helped administration and medical work and the fact that the new farms crossed or bordered on many fly-infested streams was realized to be a possible risk. The success of the scheme, and the variety and worth of goods on sale in the shops, encouraged Zande friends and relatives from the Belgian side to cross the frontier and change their allegiance. Abbott (1952) has pointed out that the incidence of sleeping sickness in the adjoining district of the Belgian Congo was higher than in the Sudan, and it is reasonable to suppose that among those who crossed the frontier were some incipient cases of sleeping sickness. The industrial, educational and administrative area around Yambio, Nzara the new town, and Li Rangu, the hospital and medical centre, became far more thickly populated than ever before. Between 1946 and 1950 there were 60 cases of sleeping sickness: in 1951, 98 new cases were found but numbers fell to 53 in 1952. In the year 1953-54 the new cases exceeded a hundred.
This new epidemic involved several rivers within a twenty-five miles radius of Yambio, all known to harbour fly. Even if staff had been available comprehensive fly control throughout the area would have been impracticable. Because of the development scheme mass movement of the people was impossible, and trade and traffic through the area could never be effectively controlled. Mass chemoprophylaxis with pentamidine had been of proved value in the Congo and elsewhere and this it was proposed should be the main line of attack in these conditions. Restricted fly control schemes in selected areas, and a fly survey to determine density along the rivers from which cases had been found were subsidiary measures designed to prevent further spread of the epidemic.
The value of pentamidine prophylaxis is threefold. Firstly it sterilized the blood stream of trypanosomes, secondly, it therefore reduces the hazard of flies becoming infected, and thirdly, if man is attacked by an infected fly the trypanosomes inoculated have less chance of survival. The principle of the campaign was not eradication of the disease with restrictive measures, but control of the epidemic and the reduction of its incidence to negligible proportions.
The political scene in the Sudan was changing rapidly and eventually this scheme was implemented with the assistance from the World Health Organization, the first occasion on which that body had assisted in sleeping sickness work. They had hardly commenced when, in June 1955, administrative troubles disrupted government in the southern areas. The delay in starting caused a further increase in cases, and when the work finally began the incidence almost rivalled the worst periods of the Tembura outbreak.
Conclusions
By 1910 the central African epidemic of sleeping sickness had invaded the Sudan through the Lado Enclave, but as this epidemic spread north its rate of spread and its severity waned. The Sudan Sleeping Sickness-Commission was able to assess probable areas of spread inside the Sudan as a result of fly surveys they carried out. Such surveys have been continued and Lewis (1951) published a map of the distribution in the Sudan of all known species of Glossina.
The Tembura outbreak, 1918 Tembura outbreak, -1940 was the largest in the Sudan and the most difficult to control. The initial measures were necessarily restrictive on the life of the people, and it was not until fly control schemes were introduced that it was possible to remove these restrictions.
T. gambiense sleeping sickness is essentially a disease of a particular environment, the environment of G. palpalis. Abbott has pointed out that the limits of the fly are not coterminal with those of the human disease. Climatic, vegetative, and seasonal differences cause variations in the fly density and in the conditions under which the man-fly contact can occur. The Sudan border is close to the northern limits of G. palpalis and these factors account for the variations in the epidemiology in the Sudan and elsewhere.
Human sleeping sickness has been one of the major tropical epidemics and like the major epidemics of temperate climates it is important to realize that its control has depended, and still depends, on public health-environmental medicine-rather than on clinical medicine. There can be few diseases where it is necessary to have such a versatile and all-round knowledge of the vector, the people, their language and customs, the fauna, the flora, and the geography of the area.
We must not forget that the early workers tackled a killing epidemic of unknown etiology in unknown territory. As the cause and vector were known so the need for a full knowledge of the environment became appreciated. The principles of control they established then apply equally to-day, though we may apply them with different techniques. The breaking of the manfly contact and the search for early cases by mass examinations of the whole population are still of prime importance. The frequency of mass examination and the methods of fly control may have changed, and the advent of chemoprophylaxis has made control possible without the need for drastic restrictions on the life of the population. Indeed modern methods of control make social and economic progress possible.
In the Sudan no praise can over-estimate the work of the British and Syrian military medical officers of the Sudan Sleeping Sickness Commission. They were the pioneers of medicine in the southern Sudan and, overcoming the natural reserve and lack of co-operation from the inhabitants, laid the foundation of future success. The British and northern Sudanese doctors who followed were able to work among a population that by comparison was fully cooperative. Eventually sleeping sickness was brought under control and the economic and the post-war development scheme of the infected areas was made a practical possibility. The story of sleeping sickness in the Sudan is but a small part of the history of the disease in Africa, but notwithstanding its special conditions a study of that history emphasizes the great achievement of the early workers and-lest we forget-the seriousness of the infection. As long as cases exist so the danger of an epidemic exists. 
